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Abstract: 
This article introduces the subject of terrorism and counter-terrorism by means of a two-person 
bimatrix game that provides some insight into the behaviour of the two players. We then 
examine three important areas in counter-terrorism tasks: the detection of terrorist cells and how 
to render them inoperable, the fortification of assets in order to protect them from terrorist 
attacks and the optimal evacuation of people from an area affected by terrorism. Basic 
mathematical models are formulated and demonstrated. This article concludes with some 
thoughts on potential extensions of the models presented here. 
Keywords: counter-terrorism | mathematical methods | social networks | evacuation models | 
hardening | traffic analysis 
Article: 
Introduction 
Following Rapoport (2004), the history of modern terrorism can be subdivided into four groups. 
The first wave consisted of the anarchists, who formed in the 1880s. They were followed by the 
anti-colonialists (1920–1960), and the New Left (1965–1995), some whose major proponents 
were the ‘Irish Republican Army’, the German ‘Red Army Fraction’ (RAF) and the Italian's 
‘Red Brigades’. Even though early terrorist groups were largely national, they did have 
connections to other groups, although their goals may have differed widely. A good example 
comprises RAF members Baader, Meinhof and Ensslin, who went to training camps in the 
Middle East that were operated by regional terrorist groups. For a short account of the 
organization's history, see, for example, WordIQ (2010). The fourth and last wave (so far) is 
described to consist of religious terrorists, who started acting in the 1990s. Weinberg and Eubank 
(2010) make conjectures about the possible demise of the fourth wave and the potential 
emergence of a fifth wave. 
For a list of organizations considered by various Western nations, as well as India and Russia, to 
fall into the terrorist mould, see, for example, the List of designated terrorist organizations 
(2011). Although the listing includes regional groups such as the ‘Shining Path’ in Peru, various 
Tamil groups, the Kurdistan Workers Party and some Irish terrorist groups (both green and 
orange), it is dominated by Islam terror groups, who make up more than two-thirds of the 
organizations. Although possibly rooted in a specific region, they have an international focus as 
far as their recruiting and activities are concerned. Furthermore, regional US groups such as the 
‘Earth Liberation Front’, or ‘lone wolves’ such as the Unabomber and the Oklahoma bomber, are 
not listed. The State Department also keeps an up-to-date list of groups that are consisted 
terrorist organizations. 
In order to obtain a feel for the magnitude of the problem, Figure 1 shows the number of terrorist 
attacks in the years 1961–2001. Figure 2 plots the number of fatalities (dead and wounded) that 
result from terrorist attacks. The graphs are based on the contribution by Sandler and Enders 
(2004), who provide historical data for the years 1968–2001. The solid lines are trend lines based 
on quadratic regression, the broken lines are based on an exponential regression and the dotted 
lines are based on moving averages. 
 
Figure 1. The number of terrorist incidents from 1968 to 2001. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.The number of fatalities (dead and wounded) from 1968 to 2001. 
The quadratic regression in Figure 1 appears to be a relatively good fit (a cubic regression looks 
very similar) and it shows an actual decline of the number of terrorist acts over time. The image 
changes dramatically, though, if we consider the number of fatalities (dead and wounded) over 
time. Graph 2 shows a general increase, regardless of the type of regression that we use, with 
dramatic outliers in 1995 and 1998. 
The subject of this work, measures of counter-terrorism, fall into a number of categories. One of 
the ways of categorizing counter-terrorism efforts is the proactive versus reactive dichotomy. 
Among the proactive measures is the profiling and identification of terrorists. Some of the 
techniques are outlined in the section ‘Identifying the players’. One may attempt the 
identification of terrorists by way of their behaviour, the company they keep, the language they 
use, their purchases and other behavioural aspects. An important aspect is also the identification 
of the terrorists’ objectives, which appears difficult, as terrorist groups tend to be opportunistic, 
taking every opportunity to create havoc. Another proactive measure deals with the possibility of 
fortifying the assets that a country has and needs to protect. Models of this type are discussed in 
the section ‘Protecting the assets’ of this article. As long as such fortifications are without 
considering the terrorists’ objectives, such strengthening is arguably a very expensive shot in the 
dark. An excellent demonstration of this effect is the well-known Colonel Blotto game (see, for 
example, Gross and Wagner, 1950), in which two players fight for dominance on multiple 
battlefields. Each commander's task is to assign armies to each of the battlefields, and whoever 
has more armies on a battlefield wins. In the special version of relevance here, the 
defender D has to protect a walled city with n gates. Both the attacker A and the defender D now 
assign armies to the gates. If the attacker has more armies at one of the gates, he can enter the 
city and wins. In the context of the subject at hand, terrorists have to succeed only once to win, 
whereas the defender has to win at all gates. This makes the game highly asymmetrical. On the 
other hand, it has been pointed out that in the preparation of an attack, the attacker must succeed 
in each step, whereas the security forces of the defender must succeed only once to intercept the 
plot. This does, at least to some extent, level the playing field. 
The costs of terrorism and counter-terrorism are difficult to assess. Frey et al (2007) estimated 
the cost of terrorism to Europe in the 15-year period from 1974 to 1988 to be in excess of US$16 
billion, more than one-fifth of total tourism revenues. Costs of the September 11, 2001 attack on 
the United States have been estimated at US$90 billion for New York City alone (Charters, 
2007), whereas the total is often projected to be in the trillions. However, according to Frey et al, 
the September 11 attacks are among the very few terrorist acts that have had an actual negative 
impact on the economy (as indicated by a measurable impact on the stock market lasting at least 
1 week). 
In comparison, the cost of mounting terrorist attacks is comparatively modest. The United 
Nations estimates that most attacks cost in the range of US$50 000; for example, the Madrid 
bombings in 2004 that killed 191 people required a cash layout by the terrorist groups of no more 
than US$10 000 (The Age, 2004). This appears to show that the police adage to ‘follow the 
money trail’ may not be very successful in leading security forces to the perpetrators. 
On the reactive front, there are ways to deal with a terrorist attack once such an attack has 
actually happened. Although it is mandatory to minimize the follow-up damage, many such 
plans amount to little more than getting the wounded out of the area, burying the dead and 
stabilizing the affected area. Evacuation planning is discussed in the section ‘Minimizing the 
damage’ of this article. 
In order to determine what effects general behavioural assumptions have, we turn to game 
theory. In order to explain the general idea, consider two players, viz., the defender D and the 
attacker A. Each of the two players has a finite number of strategies, which they choose either 
simultaneously or sequentially. There are two main solution concepts: Nash equilibria andvon 
Stackelberg solutions. Loosely speaking, a Nash equilibrium is an arrangement in which neither 
player has any incentive to unilaterally change his strategy. As such, the existence of a Nash 
equilibrium is an indication of stability of the outcome. On the other hand, von Stackelberg 
(sequential) games feature one player as the leader and his opponent as the follower. The 
opponents are assumed to have complete and correct knowledge about the game and the 
objective of their opponent. In order to solve a von Stackelberg game, we act recursively: we 
first determine the follower's reaction function by determining the follower's optimal reaction to 
each strategy of the leader. The leader will then know the consequence of each of his decisions, 
and can thus make an optimal choice. 
Typical scenarios of von Stackelberg leader–follower games include major pharmaceutical firms 
that introduce new drugs (the leaders) and manufacturers of generic drugs (the followers). In 
order to make it possible and interesting for a competitor to become a leader, he must have the 
resources to be a leader and there must be an advantage to become the leader. If one of these two 
ingredients is missing, the game will never be played, as neither competitor can be or will want 
to be the leader. On the other hand, if there exists an advantage to make the first move, a firm 
that is capable of doing so will attempt to become a leader, a result referred to as the ‘first mover 
paradox’ in marketing circles; see, for example, Ghosh and Buchanan (1988). 
Comparing the strategies of the leader and those of the follower, it immediately becomes 
apparent that the situation is not symmetric: whereas the leader has to guard against all possible 
actions of the follower by making assumptions concerning the goals and actions of the follower, 
the follower has no such problem. 
In the context of optimization, leader–follower games are modelled as bi-level programming 
problems. Whereas the follower's problem is typically not too difficult, the leader's problem uses 
input parameters that are the result of the follower's optimization problem. In other words, we 
have nested optimization problems. With the exception of very specific scenarios, such problems 
pose tremendous computational difficulties. Standard references for bi-level programming 
problems are Bard (1998) and Dempe (2002). 
In the attacker–defender game, assume that the defender D has only two options, viz., give in to 
terrorists’ demands, or to not give in. Similarly, the attacker (that is, the terrorists) A can either 
bomb the victim or refrain from doing so. This scenario results in four possible outcomes for 
each pair of (D, A) strategy combinations: do not give in, do not bomb; do not give in, bomb; 
give in, do not bomb; and give in, bomb. In order to simplify the exposition, we create a matrix, 
in which the rows refer to the defender's strategies, and the columns represent the strategies of 
the attacker. The strategy combination with the highest utility is assigned a ‘payoff’ of 4, the next 
highest a 3, then 2 and finally the lowest-ranking strategy combination receives a utility of 1. As 
the utility functions of the defender and the attacker are obviously different, the first ‘payoff’ in 
the matrix refers to the utility of the defender, whereas the second number refers to the utility of 
the attacker. A reasonable matrix is then as follows: 
 
Note that D's ‘Do not give in’ strategy actually dominates his ‘Give in’ strategy, so that D will 
never give in. The situation may be further clarified by constructing the reaction graph that 
belongs to this matrix. Its construction (see, for example, Eiselt and Sandblom, 2004) assigns a 
node ni to each of the four strategy combinations and an arc from one node to another, if the 
unilateral action of one of the two players results in a move from one outcome to another. 
Clearly, a player will only engage in such unilateral action if it is in his own best interest. 
In order to explain, suppose that D has tentatively decided to give in to A's demands and A has 
tentatively decided not to bomb, meaning that the scenario under consideration is shown as 
node n3. The defender's choices at this point are only to choose between give in or not, meaning 
stay at n3 or move to n1. As n1 has a utility of 4 to D, and n3 only has a utility of 3, Dwould prefer 
to move to n1. Similarly, suppose that the scenario n1 would be tentatively chosen and A would 
ponder the situation. A's only option is to either not bomb (that is, stay at n1 or bomb, meaning 
move to n2). As A has a higher utility to bomb, he will move from n1 to n2. The reaction graph for 
this scenario is shown in (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Reaction graph for the base model. 
It is apparent that the state n2 is a Nash equilibrium, as neither player has an incentive to 
unilaterally move out of n2. For the von Stackelberg game with D as leader (a natural choice, as 
the defender will signal first that he will or will not give in to terrorist demands), the reaction 
function includes the ‘bomb’ strategy if the defender announces not to give in, and the attacker's 
‘do not bomb’ strategy in case the defender signals that he will give in. The defender's better 
choice is for the defender to give in, so that the outcome (give in, do not bomb) results. 
Suppose now that D has developed a tool that makes it very expensive for A to carry out a 
bombing. As a result of this change,A's preference ordering changes slightly to that shown in the 
matrix. 
 
The reaction graph for this situation is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Reaction graph for the model with modified defender preferences. 
It is apparent that whereas D's strategy ‘Do not give in’ still dominates his ‘Give in’ strategy, A's 
strategy ‘do not bomb’ now dominates his ‘bomb’ strategy. The result of the seemingly minor 
change is a new Nash equilibrium at the node n1, where D does not give in and A does not bomb. 
As a matter of fact, this is the strategy that many states have been following during the recent 
decades: trying to make the ‘bomb’ option for the terrorists less attractive in case the state does 
not give in to the terrorists’ demands. The von Stackelberg solution is the same as the unique 
Nash equilibrium. 
Back in the original situation, it is not only the terrorists’ perception of their utility that may 
change. In reality, the game (or, more realistically, many similar games) is/are repeated many 
times, and both players will be able to observe and learn from each other's reactions. Over time, 
the attacker may succeed in conveying the message that a victim is better off, if they were to give 
in (by making concessions), if the terrorists do not bomb. The revised payoff table would then be 
as follows: 
 
The reaction graph of this payoff matrix is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Reaction graph with modified attacker preferences. 
It is apparent that there are now two equilibria, the hawkish ‘do not give in’ and ‘bomb’ 
combination, and the dovish ‘give in’ and ‘do not bomb’ combination. Although the dovish 
combination is preferred by both players, it is not obvious whether or not negotiations can result 
in that solution, as negotiations require communication and trust, ingredients not likely to exist in 
this context. 
Take now a step back and consider again the ‘payoffs’ we have been using in the above analysis. 
Just like profits in the context of business, the payoffs for each of the two players comprise 
‘revenues’ and ‘costs’. For the defender, the (monetary) costs include, but are not limited to, 
added security measures, coupled with a general decrease of efficiency and thus slowed growth 
of GDP, whereas the ‘revenue’ consists of ‘success stories’, such as reports concerning averted 
attacks. On the other hand, the terrorists’ costs are the fatalities on their side that occur during the 
attack and the penalty their members are assigned if and when they are caught. On the ‘revenue’ 
side, there is the added recognition among their peers and the ego boost of being associated with 
a successful attack against a much more powerful opponent, fuelled through much media 
attention. It appears that the (potential) victim can best work with the revenue and cost of the 
terrorists, as its own costs and revenue are more or less fixed, given that they try to avert a 
possible attack. In an open society, there is little that the defender can do regarding the revenue, 
as it does not control the media that will report successful and unsuccessful incidents (and, by 
doing so, in the eyes of the terrorist potentially advertise and glorify their deeds). On the side of 
the terrorists’ costs, even drastic penalties such as public hangings (assuming that such actions 
were feasible) will do little to a group of people who think very little of their own life when 
considering their ‘cause’. It is mandatory that the defender uses the attacker's utility function 
when dealing with them, rather than their own. One of the difficulties is that a democratic state is 
bound by many checks and balances, prohibiting many potentially effective courses of action, as 
they would infringe on civil liberties. Terrorists have, of course, no such considerations, making 
the struggle skewed and asymmetric. 
The Models 
The models we discuss address a number of relevant questions in the context of counter-
terrorism. One of the obvious questions is ‘who?’, as it identifies the personnel involved in the 
activities. Pertinent tools are monitoring the Internet, phone lines, social networks, purchases of 
suspect materials (a measure that may work in case of ingredients for ‘dirty bombs’, but will 
utterly fail in the case of seemingly innocent tools such as box cutters), the infiltration of terrorist 
groups or the (less expensive) use of informants. Similar counter-terrorism measures apply to 
discovering ‘how’ the next attack is to be carried out, and questions of ‘where will they strike?’, 
‘what facility will they attack?’ or ‘whom are they trying to assassinate?’ need to be addressed. 
Protective measures (also referred to as ‘hardening’) can and have been used. Identification cards 
are now required in many official buildings; security screening at airports and government 
buildings is a standard procedure; and closed-circuit TV cameras are ubiquitous. The question 
‘when’ is probably beyond the ability of analysts to answer, as terrorists tend to be opportunists, 
who strike whenever an opportunity presents itself. There may be important dates, such as 
September 11 or certain holidays or other special days, because symbolism holds a special place 
in terrorist motivation in many cases. 
A very important consideration concerns the objectives of terrorists. Typically, it is assumed that 
terrorists have grievances – however ill-conceived – that, at least in their opinion, can only 
remedied by violent means. The very insightful paper by Abrahms (2008) disputes this claim. In 
contrast, the author demonstrates that terrorist groups have continued to survive even after their 
demands have been met, and that groups with strongly divergent objectives have worked 
together, whereas others, whose goals are quite similar, have fought among themselves for 
dominance. The lack of obvious objectives will make it very difficult to actually predict future 
terrorist moves. Maybe it is this lack that has prompted some researchers to liken the spread of 
terrorist cells to the spread of cancer, whose only obvious objective is to grow; see, for example, 
the paper by Carley et al (2003) about bioterrorism. This is also in line with Niskanen's 
(1968) model of people with power, whose objectives are to maximize their own budgets and 
power, rather than to accomplish a particular goal. 
Sageman (2004) provides an interesting account concerning the motivations of individuals who 
have joined a global jihad. His conclusions are pretty much in line with those outlined in the 
aforementioned work by Abrahms (2008). In a follow-up work, Sageman (2008) discusses the 
radicalization and asserts this to be a collective, rather an individual, process. Hoffman (2006) 
disputes some of Sageman's theses. 
Identifying the players 
This section deals with issues and tools regarding (a) the identification of the individuals who are 
(potentially) involved in terrorist activities, and (b) a plan for their elimination. It should be 
noted that all methods of intelligence gathering deal with some sort of surveillance, making them 
subject to legal and privacy issues (see, for example, Posner, 2008). The key to intelligence 
gathering is profiling, that is, the association of individuals with traits, (political, ethnic or 
religious) groups, things they purchase, places they congregate either in person or in other places 
such as on the Internet (particularly the ‘dark web’, see, for example, the University of 
Arizona's Artificial Intelligence Lab), the flow of money they spend, other people whom they 
communicate with (in person, via phone Internet or any other means), and similar issues. 
Activities of individuals can be observed in all of their communications with other people, be it 
on social networks, emails, phone calls, their physical gathering at meeting places or by way of 
their transfers of money or goods. The study of social networks began with Milgram (1967) who 
initiated the concept of ‘six degrees of separation’. Early (successful) techniques include 
McGehee's (1983) ‘village survey method’ and traffic analysis. 
The first task is to distil a network of potential terrorists from the huge pool of users of email, 
social networks such as facebookand twitter, and other information. This network can be 
modelled as an undirected graph G=(V, E) with sets of nodes N and undirected edges E. Each 
node ni represents one individual, an edge eij that connects nodes ni and nj indicates that there has 
been some communication between the two individuals whose nodes are connected. In addition, 
it may be useful to assign numbers to edges or arcs that symbolize the strength of the connection, 
such as the magnitude of the money transfer, the number of calls made during the course of a 
week between any two people and so forth. 
Graphs that show ‘relations’ between individuals could have edges that symbolize kinship and 
other relations, the flow of money between individuals, or the flow of commands. In the latter 
two cases, it is mandatory to use dynamic networks, as is also customary in models of disease 
propagation. 
From the terrorists’ point of view, they will attempt to organize their cells with a number of 
objectives in mind. On the one hand, the communication structure must be simple so as to avoid 
unnecessary communication errors, while the potential for detection and the damage done by 
interrogation of captured cell members should be minimized as well. The two extremes shown 
in 6a and 6b may explain the concepts. 
 
Figure 6. Possible terrorist cell organizations. (a) safe, but inefficient, cell structure; (b) efficient, 
but vulnerable cell structure. 
The structure in Figure 6a is extremely simple. Its advantage is that the detection of any element 
and its subsequent removal and interrogation cannot result in the further detection of more than 
two other elements in the cell. The downside concerns the length of the lines of communication: 
in the worst case, when n1 wants to communicate with n5, the path includes actually four edges, 
that is, four individual communications. In contrast, Figure 6b allows direct communications 
between all cell members. At the same time, though, the detection of any individual could expose 
the entire cell. 
When analysing the structure of a network, it is useful to express the characteristics of its nodes 
by some relevant measures. Starting with Freeman (1977), different measures of centrality have 
been devised so as to indicate a central figure in a cell, who is hopefully the ringleader of the 
cell. Some of the measures are the degree of a node, the 1-median, and the node through which 
lead the largest number of shortest paths between all pairs of nodes (dubbed the betweenness 
centrality). These measures may help identify the actual structure of a terrorist cell and help 
distinguish between leader, lieutenants and foot soldiers. However, as with any proxy, the 
measure may not express exactly what it sought: a node with a large degree may simply be a 
middleman that is used by a cell leader to hide his own identity and avoid being detected. 
Krackhardt's kite graph in orgnet.com (2011) is an excellent example of an organizational 
structure and some of the centrality measures. Skillicorn (2009) uses the graph structure to 
measure the importance of a node by means of adjacency matrices and eigenvectors. Rhodes 
(2009) describes a technique to infer the structure of a terrorist cell on the basis of sample 
information. 
A number of insurgency cell models can be found in Political Research Associated (2010). Krebs 
(2002) analyses the observed communications of the nineteen September 11 terrorists in his 
contribution and Rodriguez (2005) displays the network of the Madrid bombers. Regarding the 
organizational structure of terrorist cells, Klerks (2001) points out that criminal organizations (he 
mainly investigates organized crime in The Netherlands) are no longer hierarchically structured, 
but opportunistic and likely to change. An update is provided by Krebs (2008). A similar account 
is provided by Barr and Baker (2001), who report that the ‘Earth Liberation Front’ does not have 
a clear chain of command that would destroy the functionality of the cell once the leader has 
been eliminated. This is very much in line with Bin Laden's assertion concerning the 9/11 
bombers (Michael and Wahba, 2001) thatThose who were trained to fly didn’t know the others. 
One group of people did not know the other group. 
Farley (2003) does not work with the undirected communication graphs outlined above, but 
instead uses directed graphs to model a cell's command structure. His main contribution is a 
formula that calculates the probability of a cell being rendered inefficient if k out of 
its n members have been randomly eliminated. His formula assumes that we do know how many 
members the cell has and how the structure of the cell is organized. 
An obvious question is then whom to eliminate if the members and the organizational structure 
of the cell are known. This problem can easily be formulated as a standard set covering model. In 
particular, suppose that the estimated costs of eliminating node ni are ci, and let aik=1 if node ni is 
located on path k. Observe that this formulation will require us to enumerate all paths from the 
leader to any of the foot soldiers. Although this task is normally huge, the moderate size of the 
cells and the typically sparse communication structure in the cell renders these concerns 
irrelevant. Defining now binary variables yi, which assume a value of 1, if node ni is to be 
eliminated, and 0 otherwise. We would like to point out that the different ‘costs’ to take out a cell 
member is largely determined by the fact that cells may be physically located in areas over which 
the defender has no jurisdiction. The set covering model can then be written as: 
 
As a numerical illustration, consider the graph in Figure 7, in which n1 is the leader of the 
cell, n2, n3 and n4 are lieutenants andn5, …, n10 are foot soldiers. In order to render the cell 
inefficient, all chains from the leader to each of the foot soldiers have to be interrupted. Suppose 
that this is done by eliminating individual elements of the cell. The numbers next to the nodes in 
the figure indicate the costs that are incurred to eliminate each of the elements. It appears 
reasonable that leaders are more protected and thus more costly to eliminate than foot soldiers. 
The optimal solution in this small example is to go after lieutenant n4, foot soldiers n5 and n6, and 
either lieutenant n3 or foot soldier n7 for a total cost of 10. 
 
Figure 7. Command structure. 
 
Carley et al (2002) discuss how the centrality of nodes in a social network may be used to 
identify the leader of a cell. In particular, they point out the potential destabilization of the 
removal of a leader because of multiple successors and potential infighting. In addition, one of 
the main ideas to identify (automatically or semi-automatically) a terrorist cell in social networks 
is by comparison with random groups. Gutfraind (2009) constructs a dynamic model of terrorist 
cells with leaders and foot soldiers. Using differential equations, he demonstrates the importance 
of eliminating foot soldiers. He also points out the importance of successes of a cell on future 
recruiting, and that prolonged inactivity will most likely result in a cell's demise. 
Finally, Bobeica et al (2008) perform semantic analyses of text messages among group members 
so as to determine whether or not the group plans an attack. The tool has great potential for 
automation, but the massive amounts of data and the possibility of coded and ever-evolving 
language present major challenges. 
Protecting the assets 
The issue in this section is how to protect buildings, roads, dams, pipelines, airports and other 
essential parts of the infrastructure from terrorist attacks. As far as the structure of the conflict is 
concerned, we revert again to game theory with two players, the defender D and the attacker A. 
As any analysis of a game, it is crucial to know what each of the parties actually knows about its 
opponent's strategies and objectives. In the simplest case, assume that A and D agree on the types 
of the infrastructure (from here on collectively referred to as ‘assets’) that are to be attacked and 
defended; let these assets be collected in the set J. Furthermore, suppose that A has announced 
that he will attack all assets in J. The victim will now plan to fortify (also referred to as ‘harden’) 
his assets so as to minimize the damage done by the terrorist's actions. In this context, Church et 
al (2004) discuss the reliability of assets, whereas the more recent contribution by Church and 
Scaparra (2007)discusses the fortification of assets. A probabilistic model is discussed by Pinker 
(2009), whose investigation includes warnings and the actual deployment of resources in the 
presence of a threat. 
As an aside, assets are not necessarily just important parts of the infrastructure, buildings or 
similar assets. As Silke (2008) points out, few terrorist attacks use chemical, biological, 
radiological or nuclear weapons. In particular, as homicide bombers prefer to cause as much 
personal injury as possible, ‘assets’ in the widest sense can also include crowded places or any 
sites at which significant numbers of people congregate. 
We would also like to mention that, in this article, we will exclusively look at the damage done 
in terms of lives and property lost. This is by no means to say that this is the only relevant 
measure in this context. If one's home gets burglarized, there is a tremendous loss of trust and 
faith, even if no property was taken at all. In the military context, Captain Doolittle's raid on 
Japan in April 1942 caused little visible damage, but this was the first time that the citizens of 
Japan saw the war happening on their own territory. Owing to their extreme difficulty of 
measuring psychological effects of this nature, although important in their own right, they are not 
considered in this article. 
Suppose now that the terrorist and victim are both aware what the damage is likely to be if no 
fortification (beyond what security exists at the present) is undertaken, and what the damage will 
be, if the asset is fortified. The difference is the ‘price’ of not fortifying an asset. At this stage, 
we assume that an asset can either be fortified or not. Furthermore, the victim also knows how 
much it costs to fortify each of the assets. Typically, the victim's budget is not sufficient to 
fortify all assets, and thus a choice must be made. The victim's choice will be to minimize the 
damage done by the terrorist, given that the victim fortifies only as many assets as the budget 
allows. As the damage is defined as the difference between the value of an asset before the attack 
and after the attack, and as the value before an attack is a constant, while the value after the 
attack depends on whether or not the asset is fortified, we may alternatively maximize the 
residual value of the asset. 
Formally, defining  as the residual value of the j-th asset after it has sustained an attack while 
not fortified, and define cj as the value of the asset after an attack in case it has been fortified. 
The benefit of protection is then Δj=cj− . Furthermore, letaj denote the cost of fortifying the j-
th asset and let b be the given budget. Then, we can define binary decision variables yj, which 
assume a value of 1, if the victim decides to fortify the j-th asset, and 0 if this is not the case. The 
problem of optimally allocating the budget so as to minimize the total damage (or, alternatively, 
maximize the residual value) can then be written as: 
 
Note that the first term in the objective function is a constant, so that we actually maximize the 
sum of marginal benefits of the fortification. It is apparent that this version of the problem has no 
spatial embedding and is nothing but the well-known knapsack problem; see, for 
example, Martello and Toth (1990). Furthermore, the model assumes not only that the terrorist 
will attack all targets simultaneously, but also that the attacker has full, correct and complete 
knowledge of the damage he can do. 
A minor extension of the knapsack problem occurs if the defender has chosen classes of assets 
and wants to ensure that at least one asset in each class is defended. This means that for each 
class Ck, the defender will define a constraint as: 
 
This is a knapsack problem with generalized upper bounding constraints of the type discussed 
by Eiselt (1986). 
Alternatively, we could also consider a model that allocates scarce resources to the protection of 
assets. This model is continuous, but its objective is non-linear. The idea behind this model is 
that the marginal utility of protection is decreasing. Define xj as the amount of resources 
allocated to the j-th asset and let fj(xj) denote the protection afforded by the j-th asset, 
if xj resources are allocated to it. The simplest model will then attempt to maximize the overall 
protection that is possible within a budget b, so that we can write 
 
As a numerical example, consider three assets, whose protection functions are f1(x1)=
, f2(x2)=  andf3(x3)=30+0.4x3. With b=50 resource units available, we could use 
simple bisection search on the slopes of the functions to arrive at the optimal allocation of 
1=27.1267, 2=22.79 and 3=0 for residual values of the assets of 26.0416, 40.4866 and 30. The 
protection functions for the three assets are shown as solid, broken and dotted lines, respectively, 
in Figure 8. The optimal levels of protection are indicated on that figure as dots. 
 
Figure 8.Optimal hardening. 
Another possible and potentially important extension occurs if we drop the assumption that 
terrorist and victim have the same state of knowledge concerning the damage an attack can do. 
One of the few works dealing with different perceptions in a location model with competing 
players is Eiselt (1998). Bier et al (2007) allow different perceptions with regard to the value of a 
target's protection/destruction. 
Comparing the strategies of the leader and those of the follower, it immediately becomes 
apparent that the situation is not symmetric: whereas the leader has to guard against all possible 
actions of the follower by making assumptions concerning the goals and actions of the follower, 
the follower has no such problem. All he needs to do is observe the course of action of the leader 
and then make the decision that is in his own best interest. 
Minimizing the damage 
So far, all the models that we have discussed assume that planning has been done before a 
terrorist attack with the objective of minimizing the fallout, should one occur (considering the 
fact that the attack may have compromised some of the evacuation routes as well). An entire 
stream of research deals with optimal responses given that an attack has occurred. Most such 
works go under the topic of ‘Disaster Planning’ or ‘Evacuation Planning’. Waeckerle (1991) is a 
good source regarding the medical response to such attacks. As far as evacuation planning is 
concerned, a standard reference is Perry et al (1981). It is interesting to note that the subject of 
optimally designing evacuation routes has received considerable attention in the operations 
research and computer science literature; see, for example, de Silva and Eglese (2000), Lu et 
al (2003), Osman et al(2009), just to name a few. Hamacher and Tjandra (2002) provide a good 
reference for research on this subject. 
Whereas these models are developed for evacuation of people from various unsafe sites to safe 
ones, little work has been done on the optimal evacuation planning of multi-level buildings. One 
reference is by Osman (2009), who addresses that problem by modelling and visualizing 
evacuation routes from low-rise regional buildings and out of an affected area. He then develops 
and proposes optimization models for the problem. In this context, the account by Waldau et 
al (2006) concerning the evacuation of the World Trade Center during and after the September 
11 attacks is an important contribution. Finally, it is important for counter-terrorism planning to 
locate facilities such that if the need arises evacuation planning is as expeditious as possible. In 
other words, what is needed are models that integrate evacuating planning into facility location 
and facility layout decisions. Owing to the inherent complexity of these models, they have not 
been widely studied. Notable exceptions are Sherali et al(1991) and Eiselt (1985). The first paper 
develops both a planning and an operational computer-based tool through a particular location-
allocation model that selects a set of candidate shelters from among a given set of admissible 
alternatives in a manner feasible to available resources, and prescribes an evacuation plan that 
minimizes the total congestion-related evacuation time. Computational experience is also 
provided against a set of realistic test problems formulated on the Virginia Beach network. In 
contrast, in the second paper, Eiselt (1985) describes a location model, in which given numbers 
of ‘supplies’ (that is, people, vehicles or any similar entity) are to be routed parallel to the axes 
(such as in cities planned on a grid), so as to minimize the maximal flow. The underlying 
assumption is that the larger the traffic volume, the higher the propensity of panic, confusion and 
the slower the actual evacuation. 
Finally, what the literature presently misses are models that integrate facility location, 
interdiction and evaluation planning. Given the complexity of such models, the most practical 
plan of research would be to develop initial models involving few facilities on simple graphs 
(linear graphs or trees) and use the insight gained to propose heuristics for more complex and 
realistic problems. 
The following paragraphs present a somewhat generic model that chooses emergency exits 
among a number of possible locations (determined by an engineering feasibility study), and then 
routes people from their present location to an exit or any other safe area. In order to implement 
the results, it would be most beneficial if the system were automated in the following sense. 
Sensors count the number of people walking into rooms, so that a system knows at any point in 
time how many people are present in different locations of the building. Whenever there is a 
change (that is, somebody walks from one room to another), the system recomputes the optimal 
evacuation routes in real time. The results of that optimization process are then displayed outside 
each room, where arrows, not unlike the emergency floor lighting in airplanes, direct individuals 
from their present location to a safe place. 
One limitation of this formulation is that it only addresses the task of getting people out. At the 
same time, though, first responders would have to get in. Not only does this opposing flow make 
the problem significantly more difficult, but it also – and arguably more importantly – adds to 
the confusion and panic. 
Given this scenario, we can formulate an optimization problem as follows. For the purpose of 
simplicity of the exposition, we ignore the temporal component, which means that we assume 
that all edges can be passed in unit time. In real life, we would work with (typically very large-
scale) dynamic networks. First assume that the rooms and walkways of the building are 
displayed as a graph G=(N ′, E) with the set of nodes N ′=(n1, n2, …, nn) and the set of 
edges E=(eij: i, j, ∈N ′). Each node represents a room, with si denoting the number of people in it 
at some chosen point in time. Suppose now that I denotes the set of all locations, in which people 
are present (that is, the set of rooms), and J is the set of potential exits, which are also 
represented by nodes in N. For convenience, we connect all nodes in J with an artificial 
node nn+1, which represents the safe place (or ‘outside’, if you will). Denote now the total set of 
nodes N=N ′∪{nn+1}. In addition, we have penalty functions f(xij) for all edges in the network. 
These penalty functions indicate the penalty to the walkway eij that results if xij people use that 
walkway or corridor. We only require that f(xij) are increasing functions of xij. One simple 
penalty function uses the capacity κijof edge eij, so that f(xij)=xij/κij, which is nothing but the 
proportion of the used capacity of the edge. The higher this proportion, the more highly 
congested the edge is, and the more reasons for panic and delays. This means that the penalty 
function is to be minimized. However, as each walkway produces such a penalty, we will have to 
determine an overall penalty by ‘somehow’ aggregating individual penalties. In our example 
below, we choose to use an objective that minimizes the maximum individual proportional usage 
of any of the edges. 
Defining binary locational variables yj, which assume a value of 1, if we choose to locate an exit 
at node j∈J, and 0 otherwise, and continuous variables xij, which denote the flow of people from 
node ni to node nj, we can formulate a basic location-flow evacuation model as follows: 
 
The first |N| constraints ensure that all people leave the rooms; the second |J| constraints, in 
which M 0 denotes a suitably large constant, ensure that the flow of people is directed only 
through exits that actually exist; and the last constraint ensures that exactly P exits are located, a 
number that is chosen by the decision maker, for example, the fire marshal, or building engineer. 
If the emergency exits have already been located, the problem reduces to a simple minimax flow 
problem. 
As a numerical example, consider the graph in Figure 9, where the numbers next to the nodes 
indicate the number of people located at the nodes, and the numbers in round brackets next to the 
edges indicate the capacities of the walkways. The broken lines to node n6 show the exits and 
paths to the safe place. 
 
Figure 9. Evacuation, original data. 
The optimal solution of the problem is shown in Figure 10. It is important to realize that the 
bottlenecks in the network are the flows on the arcs e32, e45, e25 and e26, all of which have a 
capacity utilization of 36.84 per cent, which appears quite reasonable. 
 
Figure 10. Evacuation, flow of evacuees. 
However, observe that whereas some of the people who are either at node n2 or who enter 
node n2 are directed from that node directly to the safe place n6, others are first sent to node n5. 
This is not only unacceptable, but also very confusing, requiring a modification of the model that 
guarantees that all people, once they arrive at one room, get directions to the outside along the 
same walkways. ‘Single source’ models of this type have been discussed in the literature 
by Galvao and Marianov (2011). 
Summary and Research Outlook 
This article first outlines a general game-theoretic model of attacker and defender that provides 
some insight into the players’ reactions given some ordinal ranking of preference functions. We 
then describe mathematical methods for some of the major areas that deal with international 
terrorism: the detection of terrorist cells, the optimal fortification of assets and the optimal 
evacuation given existing buildings and areas. The models described here are, of course, 
simplistic. The idea is to provide a starting point for future research and to outline potential 
directions that may improve knowledge about and understanding of potential reactions of 
terrorists to defenders’ policies and ways to deal with strikes once they have happened. 
Much work remains to be done, particularly in the area of ‘detect and destroy’. The present 
knowledge concerning terrorist cells (at least the part that is available in the open literature, 
which, given the nature of the field, will be very much limited), their organization and their 
command structure is crude and insufficient. One potentially interesting thread of research is the 
use of game-theoretic models that involve network design. In particular, we refer to competitive 
models, in which the attacker designs the cell he wants to use for future attacks, with the 
objective of minimizing detection, while maintaining ease of communication. The defender will 
attempt to optimally intercept the cell structure. In this game, the attacker is the von Stackelberg 
leader, whereas the defender is the follower. An analysis of the modus operandi of the terrorists 
regarding their choice of targets will improve solutions that deal with the fortification of assets. 
Opportunistic attackers will result in a fortification strategy by the defender that is close to a 
maximin solution. Finally, major improvements of practical evacuation models will devise 
systems for street closures (to let first responders to the site) and appropriate (and simple) escape 
routes for victims. Again, network design techniques can be used to plan access routes given that 
an asset is hit. Furthermore, one may also plan for added protection if access routes are destroyed 
as well. 
An important strand of research involves the design of terrorist cells. Given the (reasonable) 
assumption that terrorists are actively and intelligently planning the design of their cell 
structure, Hartnell and Gunther (2009) show how one such robust cell structure could look like. 
Knowledge of this result can accommodate the defender in their task to detect, destroy and 
defend their assets. 
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